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Abstract 
The ‘Blitz spirit’ is a popular story of Britain during the Second World War, uniting together 
with defiance and resilience to overcome the threat of invasion from Nazi Germany. 
However, this paper reviews the story of the Blitz spirit as a myth. A Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) then examines some instances when this myth was retold in British 
newspapers after the July 7th bombings in London. In this article I analyse the role of the 
Queen and Royal family as symbols of national unity and defiance. Subsequently, I argue 
that such constructions of Britishness became more complex than a monolithic national 
narration; Blitz spirit discourses often criticised Tony Blair and rejected him as a figure of 
British identity in comparison to the Queen or Winston Churchill. Therefore, this paper 
argues that whilst the Blitz spirit was a problematic feature of post-July 7th discourses, it 
did not serve one ideological purpose. Rather, through a nuanced approach to Roland 
Barthes’ model of myth, I argue that an ideological battleground occurred when a myth 
from 1940 was reused to define events in 2005. 
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Introduction 
On July 7th 2005 four British citizens 
carried out suicide bomb attacks on 
London’s public transport system, killing 
56 people. This was the most costly 
terrorist attack on British soil since the 
Lockerbie bombing in 1988 and the 
worst single bombing attack on London 
since the Second World War. After the 
bombings, British newspapers defined 
London as a stoic city that would 
respond with resilience and unity as it 
did – according to popular memory – 
during the Second World War (Kelsey 
2012a; 2012b; 2012c). This popular story 
is known as the ‘Blitz spirit’:  
It has a great script: a small gang 
of fiercely independent people 
refuse to cave in to the bad guys. 
The bad guys decide to punish the 
wilful defiance in an appalling 
show of might. Despite the 
hardships, the small gang 
becomes more tightly bound, 
laughs in the face of terror, takes 
everything the forces of evil can 
dish out and sends them packing. 
A simple story, but full of drama, 
full of powerful images and, for the 
British, scripted a long time before 
1940. (Connelly 2005: 131) 
This simple but powerful script has 
proved successful since its wartime 
production when the Ministry of 
Information’s propaganda campaign was 
designed to sustain civilian morale 
(McClain 1979: 1). This paper provides a 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Blitz 
spirit discourses that appeared in British 
newspapers after the July 7th bombings. 
Previous work in the field of CDA has 
examined constructions of national 
identity (Wodak 1999; Bishop and 
Jaworski 2003). Bishop and Jaworski 
(2003) analysed the press reporting of 
England’s match against Germany in the 
Euro 2000 championships. As they argue, 
‘in constructing the “nation”, the press 
resort to a number of discursive 
strategies, constructing and reinforcing 
national unity by invoking stereotypes, 
generic references, shared sporting and 
military history, and the timelessness of 
the nation spanning mythical past and 
indefinite future’ (2003: 244). Wodak’s 
discourse-historical work has also 
considered how ‘national narration’ (see 
Hall in Wodak 1999) constructs identity 
by evoking national consensus through 
memories, stories, rituals and traditions 
from the past. Fowler has described 
consensus as ‘the affirmation and the 
plea of all political parties, expressed in 
appeals for “one-nation”, for people to 
“pull together” and so on’ (Fowler 1991: 
16). 
This paper scrutinises the origins of the 
Blitz spirit story as a myth and how it 
was evoked after the bombings. I 
consider the Queen and other members 
of the Royal family evoking the Blitz spirit 
and their representation as symbols of 
national identity, signifying unity and 
defiance. I then argue that this 
construction of Britishness became 
more complex than a monolithic 
message of national unity. Discourses of 
national narration often ostracised Tony 
Blair and rejected him as a worthy figure 
of British identity in comparison to the 
Queen and Winston Churchill. Through 
this analysis I develop a nuanced 
perspective on how Roland Barthes’ 
model of myth can be applied to the 
Blitz spirit story, when it is retold in 
different historical contexts. This paper 
argues that whilst the Blitz spirit was a 
problematic feature of post-July 7th 
media coverage, it did not serve one 
ideological purpose. Rather, an 
ideological battleground occurred when 
elements of myth and popular memory 
were reused to define events in 2005. 
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Whilst this paper analyses discourses in 
media coverage after July 7th my 
theoretical framework draws on Roland 
Barthes’ model of myth (1993) to provide 
some historical context to critical 
understandings of the Blitz spirit. 
Barthesian myth is not commonly used 
or studied within the field of CDA. This is 
perhaps understandable since there are 
close similarities between myth and 
discourse, to which I will return shortly. 
But this paper shows how a discourse-
historical approach (Wodak et al 1999) 
can be used to examine discursive 
constructions of a story that has prev-
iously been examined through Barthes’ 
framework by those scholars I consider 
below (Calder 1991, 1999; Manthorpe 
2006; Heartfield 2005; Ponting 1990, 
1994). My approach to CDA explores 
constructions of the Blitz spirit myth, 
showing how this story from Britain’s 
past was reused by journalists and 
politicians after July 7th. In both past and 
present contexts it is the ideological 
impact of this myth that I am concerned 
with in this paper. Thus I firstly explain 
why the Blitz spirit has previously been 
defined as a myth before exploring its 
construction after the bombings in 2005. 
 
Myth and the Blitz Spirit 
Historians have reviewed the Blitz spirit 
as a myth; not as a lie about Britain’s 
past, but a simplified version of events 
that suppresses less popular memories 
of the situation in Britain at the time 
(Calder 1991, 2003; Manthorpe 2006; 
Heartfield 2005; Ponting 1990, 1994). 
Angus Calder’s work (1991) adopted 
Roland Barthes’ model in proposing that 
revisions of the Blitz spirit should not 
assert accusations of untruth. Rather, 
deconstructing myth involves reading 
beyond simplicity; addressing untold 
complexities that transcend and often 
conflict with a preferred version of 
events. As Jack Lule explains, ‘Myth 
upholds some beliefs but degrades 
others. It celebrates but also excoriates. 
It affirms but it also denies’ (Lule 2001: 
119). So Barthes’ approach sees myth as 
a simplified representation of events:  
In passing from history to nature, 
myth acts economically: it abol-
ishes the complexity of human 
acts, it gives them the simplicity of 
essences, it does away with all 
dialectics, with any going back 
beyond what is immediately visible, 
it organizes a world which is 
without contradictions because it 
is without depth, a world wide 
open and wallowing in the evident, 
it establishes a blissful clarity: 
things appear to mean something 
by themselves. (1993: 143) 
According to this model, the simplifying 
and suppressive role of myth functions 
ideologically in the preferred messages it 
delivers. Alternative accounts of London 
in 1940 provide versions of events that 
complicate and contradict those popular 
accounts of the Blitz spirit. For example, 
Ponting explains that during the Blitz 
crime rates increased ‘by nearly sixty 
percent during the war (three times the 
rate of annual increase before the war)’ 
(1990: 142). The Blitz itself provided a 
chance for opportunist thefts and the 
police had to set up an anti-looting 
squad to try to curb the problem (142). 
Due to the social disruption caused by 
the war, juvenile crime increased by 
forty-one percent in the year after the 
war started (143). According to Panayi, 
‘some of the most systematic 
persecution of racial and ethnic 
minorities in recent history took place 
during the two world wars’ (1995: 204). 
Calder explains that anti-Semitism 
inflamed during the war, especially when 
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‘better off Jews bought their way out of 
London’ (1999: 167). Fascists would 
display anti-Semitic graffiti on walls, 
blaming them for the war and hostility 
towards Jews often occurred in the 
shelters (167). 
Ponting challenges the image of class 
unity that is evoked in this myth. He 
describes Britain as a ‘deeply divided 
and unequal society’ in which the 
pressures of the war had a heavy impact 
on the poorest classes (1990: 138). He 
argues that while the East End was 
enduring a German bombing raid and 
civilians had taken cover in the local 
underground stations, numerous 
ministers and senior officials were 
enjoying the luxurious catering and 
accommodation of the Dorchester Hotel. 
As Curran and Seaton explain, some 
people were as opposed to the 
bureaucratic British administration in 
1940 as to the Nazi’s themselves (1997: 
134). Addison refers to troops returning 
from fighting and holding politicians 
responsible for their appalling 
experiences (1994: 107). Churchill’s own 
judgement as a military leader has often 
come under scrutiny (Calder 1991, 1999; 
Ponting 1990). However, the popular 
myth does not account for criticisms of 
social divisions or Churchill’s admin-
istration. Hence, I am concerned with a 
shift in historical applications of this 
myth; whilst the class inequality might be 
suppressed by discourses of unity 
evoked through Royalty after July 7th, 
Blair did not necessarily drop into a 
Churchillian role and was not protected 
by the myth of a wartime leader. Rather, 
this myth often had a reverse effect and 
discussed the political context of the 
attacks in a way that other, less critical 
Blitz spirit discourses failed to do.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
This paper does not suggest that a ‘Blitz 
spirit’ has never occurred during times of 
national crises. As Calder acknowledges, 
shops that had their front windows 
blown out would often open with signs 
out saying, ‘More open than usual’ or 
‘Blast!’ One pub opened with a sign 
saying, ‘Our windows are gone but our 
spirits are excellent. Come in and try 
them’ (1999: 174). To say that Britain 
showed no spirit or ability to cope would 
favour one particular meaning and 
provide an equally simplistic account, 
arguably proposing a reversed-myth. 
Examining myth involves addressing 
complexity rather than proposing an 
alternative ‘reality’. As Ponting states, ‘We 
must never forget those who died or 
suffered in the Second World War in 
order to defeat a vile and evil system. At 
the same time, there is no need to 
ignore some of the hard facts and less 
well-publicized lessons of that war’ 
(1990: 3). 
When language is used to reproduce 
discursive conditions suitable for the 
retelling of popular stories it is the role of 
myth that ‘legitimises and justifies 
positions. Myth celebrates dominant 
beliefs and values. Myth degrades and 
demeans other beliefs that do not align 
with those of the storyteller’ (Lule 2001: 
184). However, the ideological role of 
language is something that CDA scholars 
usually explore without any consid-
eration of Barthes’ work. Therefore, it is 
the compatibility of these terms – myth 
and discourse – that I will now address 
in explaining my approach to CDA. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Kelsey (2012) for analysis of Blair’s 
Churchillian role in Blitz spirit discourses that did 
not question his leadership or foreign policy.  
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Analytical Framework 
Methodology 
A Barthesian approach to myth is similar 
to discursive analytical frameworks that 
consider language from a functionalist 
perspective (Fowler 1991; Simpson, 
1993; Fairclough 1995; Mayr 2008; 
Richardson 2007). Like myth, it is argued 
that discourse can restrict and allow 
certain discussions of a topic: ‘Just as 
discourse “rules in” certain ways of 
talking about a topic … it “rules out”, 
limits and restricts other ways of talking 
… in relation to the topic or constructing 
knowledge about it’ (Foucault in Hall 
2001: 72-73). Discourse is therefore seen 
as ‘a culturally and socially organized 
way of speaking’ (Mayr 2008: 7). Reading 
through myth – like Calder and Ponting 
do above – actually serves a similar 
purpose to scholars of CDA: they 
challenge dominant power relations and 
attempt to tackle social inequality (Van 
Dijk 1998; Fairclough 1995; Richardson, 
2007; Wodak 1999, 2001, 2008). Wodak 
also considers discourse-historical traits 
by ‘tracing the historical (intertextual) 
history of phrases and arguments … and 
centres on political issues such as 
racism, integrating all available 
background information in the analysis 
and interpretation of the different layers 
of a text’ (2008: 9). Similarly, Barthes 
argued that ‘mythology can only have an 
historical foundation, for myth is a type 
of speech chosen by history: it cannot 
possibly evolve from the “nature” of 
things’ (Barthes 1993: 110).  
Clearly then, there are significant 
similarities between theories and analy-
ses of myth and discourse. In this paper I 
show that CDA can be used to 
deconstruct myth when a popular story 
from the past is retold after current 
events. Since retrospective work on the 
Blitz spirit has reviewed its construction 
through Barthes’ model, I continue to 
interpret the origins of this myth through 
the same framework. However, when I 
examine how this myth reappeared in 
2005, I apply the tools that a discourse-
historical approach to CDA offers: by 
examining lexical extracts in terms of 
their textual, discursive and social 
contexts CDA allows me to reconsider 
the nuanced and often contradictory 
references to a myth of popular memory 
from 1940. 
My analysis starts with the immediate 
text or linguistic elements before 
addressing ‘the broader socio-political 
and historical contexts, to which the 
discursive practices are embedded in 
and related to [macro theories]’ (Wodak 
2008: 13). Wodak’s discourse historical 
approach is significant to my research 
since it ‘integrates and triangulates 
knowledge about historical sources and 
the background of the social and 
political fields within which discursive 
events are embedded’ (2009 38). It is 
within this framework that I use a 
number of analytical tools. I do not 
explicitly refer back to these terms 
throughout my analysis. Rather, I define 
them here before I use them: 
Historical memory is a concept 
that Wodak considers in her discourse-
historical approach. Kolakowski (see 
Wodak 1999) sees this as an essential 
requirement of national identity. Similar 
to myth and collective/popular memory 
the accuracy or truth of historical 
memory is not important. What matters 
is that ‘the further into the past the real 
or imaginary memories reach, the more 
securely the nation is supported’ (Wodak 
1999: 25). 
Hyperbole involves the excessive 
exaggeration of aspects within texts. Van 
Dijk describes hyperbole as the 
‘description of an event or action in 
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strongly exaggerated terms’ (1995: 154). 
For example, he analyses the way that 
the 1993 bomb attack on the World 
Trade Centre ‘in which only a few people 
died, or other, possible terrorist attacks, 
are compared with a nuclear holocaust’ 
(154). 
Indexical meanings also play a 
referential role in texts. The way that they 
refer to, and label, certain characters in a 
story acts ideologically. For example, if a 
male character is blamed for an incident 
he might be referred to as ‘a “maniac”, a 
“monster”, a “fiend”, a “beast”, and other 
terms which suggest sub-humanity, 
depravity and animalistic abandon’ 
(Richardson 2001: 51). Equally, an 
innocent male will feature inferences to 
his domestic role as a ‘family man’ or 
‘hubby’ (51). 
 Intertextuality refers to the 
interlinking of one text to other texts in 
both past and present contexts (Wodak 
2008: 3). This might involve repeated 
references to the same events, or the 
transferring of ‘main arguments from one 
text into the next’ (3). This also applies for 
the recurrence and continued reference 
to main actors or topics within stories 
across texts (3). Events and symbols from 
the Second World War recurred across 
texts in my sample. 
 Intentionality considers the 
intentions of those producing texts and 
purpose the text is serving for what 
those producing want to do and what 
meaning they want to make (Wodak 
2008: 9). This is a central concern when 
considering who is speaking and the 
purpose that their analysis or 
commentary actually serves. 
 Lexical choices can help reinforce 
the ‘us and them’ dichotomy in 
representations concerning conflict or 
terrorism. Van Dijk refers to lexical 
choices for describing others such as 
‘the case of the well-known pair of 
freedom fighter and terrorist’ (1995: 143). 
Other examples are ‘more indirect or 
coded [like] the use of moderate (vs. 
radical) when describing groups, parties 
or countries that espouse our ideologies, 
that are our friends or that do not 
threaten our interests’ (143). These 
signify the bias choices that occur in 
representations that are intended to 
shape the views of those interpreting 
them. For example, if an enemy ‘destroys’ 
something, we may ‘suppress it’. When 
they ‘kill’, we, on the other hand, 
‘eliminate’ or ‘neutralise’ (see Allan 2004: 
162-163). Lexical choices can de-
legitimise one party or group and justify 
the actions of another. 
 Metaphors are words used as 
‘devices for simplifying and giving 
meaning to complex and bewildering 
sets of observations that evoke concern’ 
(Edelman 1971: 65). Metaphors have also 
been considered in a more cognitive 
sense: Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue 
that metaphors are elements of human 
thought that help people to understand 
and structure thoughts via connections 
drawn between different experiences. 
 Recurrence accounts for the 
repetition and repeated use of linguistic 
and discursive elements and mech-
anisms across texts and throughout my 
sample. Wodak describes recurrence as 
a contributing factor towards cohesion 
and it involves the ‘repetition of lexical 
elements, sentence components and 
other linguistic elements’ (2008: 8). 
 Predication considers the ‘words 
used to represent more directly the 
values and characteristics of social 
actors’ (Richardson 2007: 52). As Reisigl 
and Wodak point out, predicational 
strategies provide ‘the very basic process 
and result of linguistically assigning 
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qualities to persons, animals, objects, 
events, actions and social phenomena’ 
(2001: 52). 
 
These terms that I have listed above 
provide me with an appropriate set of 
tools for my textual analysis below. 
Whilst the popular approach of 
Fairclough (1995) in previous linguistic 
analysis focuses on broader concerns 
regarding discursive and social practices, 
the textual focus of this paper is more 
concerned with the way that texts cover 
particular lexical fields and the socio-
cognitive role (van Dijk 1998) they play in 
constructions of popular memory. It is 
the components of the latter that map 
out intertextual elements, which function 
to construct and reproduce familiar 
messages, signs and symbols of the Blitz 
spirit. Hence, this paper is focused on 
the semiotic-analytical approach offered 
through Barthes’ model of myth. Since I 
am concerned with the ideological 
impact of myth, I share those interests of 
other approaches to CDA, which 
challenge discourses that reinforce 
inequality in social, economic and class 
relations (van Dijk 1998; Fairclough 1995; 
Richardson 2007). My approach to 
discursive practices focuses on textual 
and cognitive functions in the sense that 
‘authors of texts draw on already existing 
discourses and genres to create a text 
and … how receivers of texts also apply 
available discourses and genres in the 
consumption and interpretation of … 
texts’ (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 69). 
This is particularly relevant in my 
approach since my analysis is concerned 
with myth, popular memory, and national 
narration; these elements reflect what 
Blommaert (1999: 5-6) refers to in 
systems of reproduction, reception and 
remembering, which affect the way that 
texts are produced and consumed since 
socio-historical and cultural mechanisms 
form discourses and produce meaning. 
Again, this differs from other approaches 
concerned with the literal, physical 
processes and practices of journalism 
and how a text is developed in a 
practical sense. The level at which I am 
concerned with social practice considers 
what a text reflects about society and the 
subsequent implications it can have on 
society – this being a similar concern 
shared by scholars across various 
disciplines of CDA (Fairclough 1995; 
Wodak 1999, 2001, 2008; van Dijk 1998; 
Richardson 2007; Mayr 2008). 
Although my framework is fundamentally 
‘critical’ in its approach to discourse it 
does not tackle one ideological 
perspective. Rather, a broader discourse 
analytical framework is adopted for 
addressing discursive complexities and 
contradictions in negotiated power 
relations. I adopt Gramsci’s approach to 
power (1971) since he accounts for the 
complexities of ideological negotiation. 
For Gramsci, ideology is more than a set 
of ideas that should be assessed 
according to the truth or falsity of their 
content. He argued that ideology 
manages social unification, which 
combines the interests of social classes 
and a hegemonic class is one that 
successfully combines multiple social 
interests, but still maintains its power 
and control of the dominant order 
(Gramsci 1971). His theory of hegemony 
does not offer an account of a 
monolithic political narrative or system; it 
addresses ‘a site of ideological struggle’ 
(Allan 1999: 85) that seeks to gain 
consent for the dominant values and 
ideals at stake. Hegemony, therefore, 
‘involves the winning of consent to the 
social order and particular directions 
which that social order may take’ (Wayne 
1999: 177). Gramsci recognised a 
complex unity in an elite superstructure 
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that enables a ruling class to maintain 
social domination (Gramsci 1971). He 
argued that the ruling bloc would always 
maintain power as well as consent via 
the cultural and social institutions whose 
interests would converge in this complex 
unity. It is the complex unity evoked 
through discourse that I address below.  
My sample consisted of 257 newspaper 
articles from sixteen national British 
newspapers between July 8th and 
August 8th, 2005.2 This sample includes 
the popular broadsheet and tabloid 
newspapers across Britain’s mainstream 
market, accounting for centre-left and 
centre-right wing positions. Through my 
analysis of articles from these 
newspapers I consider a range of 
sources across this political spectrum of 
publications; the Blitz spirit was not 
confined to any niche market or political 
orientation among the popular press. 
Whilst my other analyses (also developed 
from the sample below) often focus on 
Blitz spirit ‘news’ stories (Kelsey 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c), most articles in this 
analysis are ‘comment’ and ‘opinion’ 
pieces. My sample did not eliminate any 
type of story since I studied the different 
contexts in which the Blitz spirit was 
discussed. As my previous work has 
demonstrated, the Blitz spirit is 
discussed in various different forms and 
discursive contexts. The material covered 
in this analysis consists of a particular 
discursive niche from my sample and 
provides further insights to the way in 
which the Blitz spirit functions as a 
discursive and ideological mechanism, 
especially in political opinion and 
argumentation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   Guardian, Observer, Independent, Independent 
on Sunday, Times, Sunday Times, Daily Mail, Mail 
on Sunday, Daily Express, Sunday Express, Daily 
Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Daily Star, Daily 
Mirror, News of the World, People, Sunday Mirror, 
The Sun, Sunday Star.	  
I gathered my sample through Nexis 
using the following search terms: ‘Blitz’ 
OR ‘Second World War’ OR ‘World War 
Two’ OR ‘WW2’. I then gathered all 
articles that mentioned the Second 
World War in relation to the bombings. 
This included the popular broadsheet 
and tabloid newspapers across Britain’s 
mainstream market, accounting for 
centre-left and centre-right wing 
orientations. Whilst my sample caught a 
range of discourses, this paper focuses 
on two discursive fields: discourses of 
Royalty that evoked the Blitz spirit and 
drew on Britain’s national narration; and 
a nostalgic discourse that rejected Tony 
Blair due to his inferiority and lack of 
moral compatibility within this national 
narration. I show that whilst Royalty and 
Churchill remained as proud symbols of 
defiance and national narration, the 
prominence of these characters was 
actually a problem for Blair. I also 
examine the discursive context of a 
George Galloway article, which 
challenged the origins of the Blitz myth 
in 1940 as well as its role in 2005, 
considering this text’s production and 
the paradoxical interests of Galloway 
writing in the Mail on Sunday. My 
approach here does not challenge 
Barthes’ model of myth but it does 
develop and refine it since I look at the 
negotiable, ideological role of myth 
across different historical contexts.  
 
Findings and Analysis 
Connelly’s assertion that during the 
Second World War ‘King and Queen 
came to know their people and their 
people them, as all did their bit without 
murmur’ (Connelly 2005: 129) highlights 
the symbolic role of Royalty in the myth 
of the Blitz spirit. This story was played 
out again after July 7th. Royalty played a 
central role in cross-generational dis-
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courses, providing symbols of national 
defiance and implying a sense of 
national, hereditary duty and spirit that 
runs throughout Britain’s national 
narration.  
 
Queen and country united (again):   
The symbolic role of Royalty 
As Manthorpe (2006) points out, the 
Queen made explicit reference to her 
previous wartime experience in her 
appeal to a generation that has ‘been 
here before’. For example, a Times article 
on July 9th quoted the Queen: ‘Sadly, we 
in Britain have been all too familiar with 
acts of terror and members of my 
generation, especially at this end of 
London, know that we have been here 
before’ (Hamilton 2005: 7). Other 
members of the Royal family praised the 
same level of spirit as the Queen. Prince 
Andrew said: ‘The way that Londoners 
pulled together was quite extraordinary’ 
(7). The Duchess of Cornwall summed up 
the calm response of victims at a 
hospital she visited: ‘It was very sort of 
British, wasn’t it?’ (7). Similarly, Prince 
Phillip described his amazement at the 
resilience of the public: ‘What I can never 
get over is the resilience of the British 
people who have set us all a fantastic 
example of how to recover’ (7). These 
contributions increase the perception 
that Royalty can speak for the nation and 
implied that a typical British stiff upper 
lip attitude was upholding national 
morale. They reinforced the idea that the 
British never panic in their response to a 
crisis. 
Largely due to the commemorations on 
10th and the unveiling of a war memorial 
on 9th, the Queen featured as a central 
sign of defiance following the attacks. A 
Daily Mail headline on July 9th said: 
‘Queen sends a message of defiance to 
the bombers’ (Rayner 2005: 5). A News of 
the World headline on July 10th echoed 
this message of defiance: ‘We are not 
afraid’ (Goodman 2005). It continued: 
‘The Queen yesterday defied the terror 
threat to pay tribute to women of the 
Second World War. Her majesty shrugged 
off the heightened security situation to 
unveil a memorial to the seven million 
who joined up’ (ibid). Her choice to ride 
down the Mall in an open-top Range 
Rover for the commemoration events the 
next day provided a metaphor for 
defiance. The Daily Telegraph on July 11th 
described the Queen’s arrival down the 
Mall as an act of defiance: ‘The Queen 
defied the threat of terrorist attack 
yesterday to ride down the Mall in an 
open top Range Rover at the head of 
veterans of the Second World War’ 
(Tweedie and Davies 2005: 1).  
The Queen was represented as a definer 
of defiance when it was suggested that 
the public had endorsed the resistance 
she voiced after the bombings. The 
Sunday Times on July 10th described 
people endorsing the Queen’s message: 
‘Many echoed the spirit of resistance 
voiced by the Queen the previous day’ 
(Wavell 2005: 5). Another Times article on 
July 11th described the unity between 
Royalty and the public, bound together 
by defiance: ‘The Head of State took 
openly to the streets in an exuberant 
celebration of our finest hour, and was 
joined by many thousands of her 
subjects delivering the clearest possible 
message that London will not be cowed 
by the cowardly’ (Bates 2005: 2). This 
article used memories of the Queen’s 
appearance during the Second World 
War with her parents as a sign of cross-
generational unity: ‘As a climax, the 
Queen emerged on to the same palace 
balcony where she had stood 60 years 
ago with her parents to acknowledge the 
vast crowd’ (2). A Sunday Express 
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headline on July 10th said: ‘Queen leads 
our nation’s defiance in face of terror’ 
(2005: 22) and quoted the Queen: ‘In her 
proud assertion that “They will not 
change our way of life”, our Queen has 
spoken for the country. Like her parents 
before her, she is leading from the front’ 
(22). This article acknowledged the 
general debate regarding the role of the 
Royal Family in contemporary society. 
But it sees their response in a time of 
crisis as a valuable justification for their 
status: ‘To put it bluntly, this is what they 
are here for’ (22). The same article 
continued to make an explicit statement 
of support for the monarchy by referring 
to Royalty as a symbol of Britain as a 
nation: ‘And this, more than anything, 
highlights the importance of the 
monarchy today. Queen Elizabeth II is 
not just our sovereign, she is a 
figurehead for Britain. … When she 
stands up and voices defiance against 
those who want to destroy us, she, and 
the other members of the Royal Family, 
symbolise Britain as a whole’ (22).  
Ideologically, this is further evidence of 
the legitimising power of the Blitz spirit, 
as part of a discourse that is complicit in 
accepting the taken for granted status of 
a monarchy. The concept of a united, 
utopian public, represented by one ‘true 
voice’, gains authority from the con-
notative symbolism of popular Blitz 
memories. The Queen’s hospital visits 
after July 7th evoked memories of her 
Mother’s visits to the East End during the 
Second World War. The Sunday Express 
article above added: ‘The East End of 
London never forgot that the Queen 
Mother came to them in their hour of 
need during the Blitz; her daughter has 
now done the same for the whole of the 
UK’ (22). The recurring tradition of Royalty 
making public appearances in support of 
victims upholds the notion of a hered-
itary spirit that binds British generations 
together.  
However, royalty are not just icons of 
national narration, they hold the same 
popular memories in a discourse that 
they are caught up in. They are part of 
the social practices that construct 
popular discourses and they remember 
symbolic moments and signs from 
throughout history, like everyone else. 
Whilst the Queen’s leading role is 
important, the repetition of the Royal 
Family’s view through other family 
members helped maintain a message of 
defiance. These descriptions connote the 
defiance expressed by Royalty during the 
Blitz when they refused to leave 
Buckingham Palace, pledging to stay 
even if the Nazis managed to launch a 
successful invasion.  
The Queen defiantly leading at the head 
of veterans connotes a battle theme in 
which an army is led to war. The concept 
of a current threat that the Queen was 
seen to defy supported the notion of war 
in a current, domestic context. 
Commemorating the end of the Second 
World War after the bombings became a 
means of implying a state of war at 
present. Ideologically, Second World War 
discourses were problematic since they 
not only connoted war, but they invoked 
memories of a different type of conflict; 
the threat London faced did not 
compare to traditional warfare or the 
threat of a foreign force. This was a 
domestic threat and British citizens had 
carried out the attacks on their own 
people. Thus a Blitz spirit analogy 
simplified constructions of a public voice 
and suggested a recurrence of military 
conflict.  
The discursive elements considered 
above set the narrative tone of an easily 
understood and recognisable story. They 
confirm what Connelly means when he 
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describes the Second World War as a 
simple story that is full of drama and 
powerful images (2005: 131). The 
slogans, memories and cross-
generational connections provided 
through the Royal family are symbolic 
elements of this story. As Ian McClaine 
explains: ‘British civilian morale during 
the Second World War has subsequently 
assumed the quality of myth’ (1979: 1). 
This myth is a story which ‘encapsulates 
for its believers all the qualities they see 
themselves as possessing in cir-
cumstances of extreme adversity’ (1). The 
Queen was an untouchable icon in 
critical and uncritical discourses in my 
sample. Of any critical articles that 
complicated Blitz spirit analogies (which I 
discuss below), none of them interrupted 
or critiqued the contributions of royalty. 
The sensitive and powerful poignancy of 
the Second World War commemorations 
provided a discursive shield against any 
challenges to the preferred message. But 
this was not always the case for Blair.  
 
Neglected by nostalgia: Blair as inferior 
to the Queen and Churchill 
Complexities in cross-generational dis-
courses used the Blitz spirit to criticize 
Blair and his role as Prime Minister. This 
was mainly because the sense of pride 
that some memories evoked would 
claim a higher moral ground than Blair 
could. The criticism that he (and 
sometimes George W. Bush) faced in this 
discourse reinforced the symbolic status 
of the Queen and Churchill as iconic 
figures of national narration. The Sunday 
Mirror questioned Blair’s messages of 
defiance after the bombings by 
contrasting him with the Queen:   
Interesting to see that while Tony 
Blair – who has told us all we must 
not be cowed by the bombers – 
drove down the Mall for last 
weekend’s World War Two tribute 
in a bullet-proof limo with 
blacked-out windows while the 
Queen made the journey in an 
open Range Rover. Nice to see that 
at least our 78-year-old monarch 
wasn’t cowed. Our PM, however, 
was taking no chances (Malone 
17/09/05: 29). 
The delivery of Blair’s speeches was a 
central point of scrutiny; his response to 
the bombings was, at times, described as 
incomparable to Churchill: ‘It was throw 
up time when Blair was compared to 
Churchill by some commentators. What 
an insult!’ (Elder 2005: 16). Elder 
contrasted Churchill’s ‘fight them on the 
beaches’ speech with the view of 
theatrics, dishonesty and deception from 
Blair: ‘Blair’s comments on the London 
outrage were his usual thespian display: 
the extended dramatic pauses, the 
exaggerated halting tones. Years of 
duplicity, deception and spin cannot be 
wiped out by using a hideous tragedy to 
reinvent liar Blair’ (Elder 2005: 16).  
The Guardian also criticised the news 
media for what it saw as desperate 
attempts to feature Blair’s moments of 
‘hammy trademark declaration’ 
(Aitkenhead 23/06/05: 7). He was 
accused of providing performance over 
information in a media-soundbite 
culture:  
News channels can’t get enough of 
them: on the day of the bombings, 
they kept interrupting coverage to 
repeat his tremulous broadcast 
from Gleneagles, and a few hours 
later he was back again with a new 
one, possibly worried that Ken 
Livingstone had outdone him. Both 
men’s performances were debated 
by pundits as though the primary 
importance of the bombs was the 
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race they had triggered to coin the 
best soundbite (7). 
The Independent on Sunday criticised 
the Churchillian symbolism that had 
appeared in political responses to the 
attacks: ‘Politicians have also sought 
comfort in … means of avoiding reality, 
by subscribing to the nostalgic myth of 
the spirit of the Blitz…. In his latest 
incarnation as the Churchill of local 
government, Ken Livingstone … has 
spoken of how London has endured 
bombs of various kinds before’ 
(24/06/2005: 26). A Guardian article on 
July 26th criticised some newspapers for 
repeating Blair’s rhetoric without fully 
engaging with political complexity: ‘They 
have allowed a combination of hubris 
and naivety to get the better of rational 
judgment. And they have been reluctant 
to allow difficult truths to get in the way 
of simplistic explanations and in-
vocations to the Blitz spirit’ (Kampfner 
2005: 21). It also criticised previous 
critics of Blair for now ‘rallying behind 
our latter-day Churchill. A prime minister 
responsible for the biggest foreign policy 
calamity of the past 50 years is now 
being feted as a great ‘wartime’ 
statesman’ (21). The latter was part of a 
recurring discursive trait that criticised 
Blair’s foreign policies. The Bush-Blair 
alliance was another problematic 
element for Blair in Blitz spirit 
discourses. 
Critical comparisons between Bush and 
Churchill demonstrate the discursive 
sensitivities around the reputation of a 
‘special relationship’ between Britain and 
America. The Times on July 23rd 
examined the extent to which 
Churchillian rhetoric fuelled the oratory 
of responses to July 7th: ‘Churchill is 
embedded in Tony Blair’s rhetoric, and 
behind every reference to the “Blitz 
spirit”. A brooding, bulldog bust of 
Churchill is prominently displayed in the 
Oval Office by George W. Bush, while Eliot 
Cohen’s stirring account of Churchill’s 
wartime leadership is required reading in 
the White House’ (Macintyre 2005: 25). 
The ‘brooding, bulldog bust’ is not 
critiqued here; Churchill’s myth itself is in 
full effect. However, the application of the 
myth in a present context is rejected. 
Including Bush in this account raises a 
question regarding the legitimacy of a 
Blair-Bush alliance and their moral 
position in relation to Iraq. It is the 
strength of Churchill’s iconic status that 
harmed the image of this alliance. On 
July 24th the Independent challenged the 
legitimacy of Blair’s words and the 
judgement. After scrutinising Blair’s 
decisions on foreign policies – from an 
allegiance with America to the loss of life 
caused by an illegal war – the article 
concluded with the following statement: 
‘Mr Blair wants to be a modern-day 
Churchill, but in reality he is another 
Chamberlain again – in denial and 
wrong’ (2005: 29). Blair becoming 
Chamberlain instead of Churchill is still a 
mythic analogy. It is reversing a 
discourse that is already based around 
archetypal conventions. Therefore, the 
myth is not being abolished here; it is 
maintained by the transition from one 
character role to another. Whilst the 
simplicity of one discourse is challenged, 
the fundamental myth remains through a 
Second World War analogy. Nonetheless, 
it does provide a more complex analogy 
to Blair’s role and responsibility. It 
followed a more critical narrative in 
which the past was used to interpret July 
7th in a more complex way, which 
recognised a degree of British 
responsibility for the attacks. 
The Times on July 23rd raised the 
question, ‘How would Churchill have 
answered the Islamist threat?’ (Macintyre 
2005: 25). Whilst arguing that Churchill 
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would have supported the war in 
Afghanistan, Macintyre is not convinced 
that he would have supported the war in 
Iraq (25). As an indirect criticism of Blair, 
he claimed: ‘Churchill also knew that the 
“highest moral value” attaches to striking 
the second blow, to responding to 
provocation: he would not I believe have 
started a pre-emptive war’ (25). Although 
Churchill’s military tactics and political 
integrity has been scrutinised and often 
criticised (Ponting 1990, 1994; Calder 
1991, 1999; Jenkins 2001; Addison 
1994), the popular memory of Churchill 
had a negative impact on Blair’s image. 
However, George Galloway’s opinion 
piece in the Mail on Sunday was one of 
the few articles in my sample that not 
only critiqued the application of a Blitz 
spirit myth to July 7th, but also discussed 
the origins of the myth that Calder, 
Ponting and others address. Galloway 
took an explicitly critical stance against 
the memory of the Blitz spirit itself: ‘The 
spirit of the blitz is often evoked, the 
stoicism, the “London can take it” yells to 
Churchill as he toured the East End. This 
is a sepia-softened memory, of course’ 
(27). Galloway then repeated Ponting’s 
interpretations of class issues that 
proved more divisive than unifying: ‘The 
people did not all act as one under 
Hitler’s bombs. The rich booked into 
West End hotels. Some of them secretly 
treated – or wished to – with the Reich’ 
(27). Meanwhile, according to Galloway, 
the working classes did not unite in the 
way that the myth itself suggests: ‘There 
was looting of bombedout homes and 
businesses and fighting over places on 
the floor of the Underground (having had 
to fight to be allowed into the stations in 
the first place)’ (27).  
Galloway also combined his criticism of 
Western foreign policy with the issue of a 
domestic threat, created by the 
resentment that has arisen from 
legislative responses during the war on 
terror: ‘After 9/11, I said in the Commons 
that the only test which mattered about 
what we did next was whether it made 
matters better or worse and, if we 
handled this the wrong way, we would 
create 10,000 new Bin Ladens. Now we 
have them, working in fish and chip 
shops, playing cricket and speaking in an 
‘ee, by ‘eck’ accent similar to Geoffrey 
Boycott’s’ (27). Galloway was critical of 
the fact that mainstream politicians are 
the only ones given privileged access in 
the media and the inward looking 
sympathies evoked by mainstream 
voices:  
But there is a self-delusion or worse 
at the heart of all the statements at 
these vigils from the mainstream 
politicians (who are, of course, the 
only ones given a microphone). They 
seek to explain all this trouble in the 
world as merely outbreaks of ‘evil’ 
terrorism, without cause and 
therefore without remedy except an 
endless, limitless ‘war on terror’. Yet 
our dead are not the only ones. Not 
one mainstream political leader has 
yet had the heart or the guts to 
acknowledge the deaths of 
hundreds of innocent Iraqi civilians. 
(27) 
He insisted that the general public know 
how Britain has ended up in this position 
and Blair’s intended affect would fail, 
addressing what he saw as drama-
turgical and ritualistic political 
statements from Blair: ‘And no amount of 
hoodwinking by Tony Blair in full “Diana” 
mode will make [the public] think 
otherwise’ (27). Whilst Galloway’s main 
point was critical of Blair, he did this 
within a context that deconstructed the 
way that Blair’s rhetoric was designed to 
persuade or manipulate opinion. The 
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latter enabled Galloway to challenge Blitz 
spirit discourses and the origins of the 
myth itself.  
However, it is ironic that Galloway was 
writing in the Mail on Sunday. There is an 
editorial dilemma here for the 
newspaper and, in theory, a political 
dilemma for Galloway. Galloway’s left 
wing political stance would usually be 
incompatible with the Mail on Sunday’s 
conservative values. However, both 
parties in this instance had a shared 
interest in criticising Blair. Their 
motivations might have differed but their 
broader target of criticism was the same. 
This is what I refer to as a case of 
paradoxical persuasion in discursive 
practices: the Daily Mail’s readership and 
editorial interests would not want to be 
associated with Galloway and neither 
would Galloway or his supporters want 
to be associated, or in alliance, with a 
conservative newspaper. However, a 
shared opposition to Blair played a 
unifying and persuasive role. This shared 
interest not only complicated the 
application of the Blitz spirit myth in a 
different historical context but it 
prompted a revision of the myth itself. As 
this analysis has shown, applications of 
myth are open to negotiation; there are 
wider ideological battles to consider 
when applying a popular myth from 
1940 to a dissimilar set of 
circumstances in 2005. 
 
Conclusion 
The negotiated power relations that 
occurred in the ideological complexities 
of Blitz spirit discourses were particularly 
significant in the complicated relation-
ship between royalty, the public and 
Blair. Although there were plenty of 
discourses that were entirely uncritical of 
any leading power in my sample (Kelsey 
2012a), critical discourses still occurred 
in some contexts. This system of 
negotiated power was mobilised by a 
myth, a moment in history, and common 
ground of popular memory and identity: 
the Blitz spirit. As I have demonstrated, 
myth and discourse-historical connect-
ions between past and present are under 
constant review. The ideological role of 
myth varies, even if the power and 
nostalgia of recurring traits in popular 
memory are difficult to break down. I 
have expanded on Barthes’ model by 
showing that shifts in historical contexts 
and wider discursive time periods 
complicate the way that myth operates. 
This paper has contributed an 
understanding of the complex relation-
ship between history, myth, popular 
memory and current conflict. My analysis 
reflects the dynamics of ideology and 
power relations in the theoretical 
approaches discussed in my method-
ology. I have considered the nuanced 
role of this myth and how Second World 
War analogies mobilised various 
discourses, which did not serve one, 
ideological interest. Since examining and 
scrutinising myth involves the exploration 
of complexities and contradictions that 
myth suppresses in its simplifying form, 
my analysis has not proposed one 
ideological or prejudicially biased 
position. Rather, this work has explored 
the connections between discourse and 
historical context (Wodak 1999, 2008, 
2009) and how language is used to serve 
particular interests (Brown and Yule 
1983). This paper has also shown that 
journalists, politicians and the public are 
caught up in complex fields of cultural 
rituals (Sanders 2008; Charteris-Black 
2011) and social practices (Fairclough 
1995), which influence and are 
influenced by myth. 
The ideological battleground between 
Blitz spirit discourses demonstrates 
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negotiated forms of power (Gramsci 
1971; Allan 1999; Jones 2006; Hall 1981). 
Although the Blitz spirit reproduced the 
interests and attitudes of the elite (Hall 
1998; Fowler 1991) it also challenged 
them. Whilst myth and popular memory 
does act ideologically, whom it benefits 
is complex. As Gramsci (1971) argues, 
the diverse interests of subaltern groups 
can still play an active role in 
negotiations of power, although the 
dominant order is still maintained. To 
reiterate Jones’ point, when ‘a 
hegemonic project is truly expansive, 
then this group will feel a strong bond of 
identification with the meanings and 
values of the leading group’ (Jones 2006: 
58). The Blitz spirit is a myth that 
provides this sense of unity between 
subalterns and leading groups. The 
national narration that evokes this unity 
reflects Gramsci’s notion of a ‘material 
existence in the cultural practices, 
activities and rituals of individuals 
striving to make sense of the world 
around them’ (Allan 1999: 85).  
Although I have argued that the myth of 
the Blitz spirit was problematic and 
complicated in the role that it played 
after July 7th, it is important to 
acknowledge that we need stories and 
myths to understand the world. As Lule 
argues: ‘Storytelling will never be in crisis 
(even if individual storytellers are) 
because storytelling is an essential part 
of what makes us human. We 
understand our lives and our world 
through story. Perhaps stories are so 
much part of us because human life 
itself has the structure of story. Each of 
us has a central character.… We need 
stories because we are stories’ (2001: 4). 
Therefore, the scrutinising of storytellers 
and the roles of characters that they 
establish is an essential process. The way 
that discourses and popular memories 
construct representations of terrorism 
shows why media scholars should 
scrutinise the production and substance 
of storytelling. As Barthes argued, people 
want an image of passion rather than 
passion itself (1993: 18). The Blitz spirit 
offers this theatrical element, acting 
ideologically in the messages it delivers 
(and those it suppresses). The national 
unity that Churchill evoked was fragile 
and widely contradicted by sections of 
British society. So was Blair’s. None-
theless, the impact that a myth has, and 
the naturalised appearance it carries, 
relies on a strength and capability that 
can survive speculation. The myth that 
Churchill depended on could ‘readily ride 
over proofs that in extremity Churchill 
and others made errors of judgement or 
sanctioned morally suspect actions’ 
(Calder 1991: 90). As Calder argues, the 
‘structure of myth depends on the 
leaving out of certain things’ (90). 
Simplistic stories can be powerful; they 
strike us with a ‘common sense’ impact 
that can sometimes be difficult to 
breakdown. But the ideological effects of 
these stories have a significant impact 
on how we make sense of the world. As 
Ponting clarifies: ‘We must never forget 
those who died or suffered in the 
Second World War in order to defeat a 
vile and evil system. At the same time, 
there is no need to ignore some of the 
hard facts and less well-publicised 
lessons of that war. After fifty years it is 
time to face up to that reality’ (Ponting 
1990: 3). Therefore, if myths from the 
past are to be invoked in the present, we 
should not avoid learning some less-
popular lessons from either moment in 
time. 
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